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Perhaps the most challenging aspect of the prosecution’s task in a rape trial is proving that 
consent was absent. Despite the centrality of consent, the concept is not legislatively defined 
in Irish law. In this respect Ireland has lagged considerably behind other comparable common 
law jurisdictions. Irish guidance on consent continues to be gleaned from common law rules 
and is generally not sufficiently developed to contribute to minimising the prosecution’s 
difficulties of proving an absence of consent in rape trials. This article argues for the 
introduction of a statutory definition of consent in Irish law and considers the form that a 
prospective definition should take.   
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Introduction 
Consent is the central issue in most contested rape trials. To prove that a rape occurred, the 
prosecution must show that: (1) there was sexual intercourse; (2) it was non-consensual and; 
(3) the defendant had the requisite mens rea regarding consent.1 In the majority of rape cases 
forensic evidence identifies the offender and verifies that sexual activity has occurred.2 Thus, 
                                                          
 BCL LLM PhD, Lecturer in Law, University of Limerick. The author would like to thank Professor Shane 
Kilcommins, University of Limerick and Dr Mary Donnelly, Law Department, University College Cork for 
helpful comments and suggestions on the material which is contained in this article. However, the views 
expressed herein, as well as any errors, are those of the author alone.  
1 That is, that the defendant knew that the complainant was consenting or was reckless as to whether or not she 
was consenting or that he did not hold an honest belief that the complainant was consenting: Criminal Law 
(Rape) Act 1981, s. 2.  
2 D.D. Koski, ‘Jury Decision-making in Rape Trials’ (2002) 38 Criminal Law Bulletin 21. See also: J. Temkin, 
Rape and the Legal Process, 2nd edn (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2002) 166. Forensic examinations can 
uncover traces of semen which are relevant in demonstrating that sexual contact has occurred and can be used to 
help establish the identity of the perpetrator through DNA profiling: A.R.W. Jackson and J.M. Jackson, 
Forensic Science, 2nd edn (Pearson Education Ltd: Harlow, 2008) 208. Even where semen traces are not present, 
a defendant may be identified by the presence of other forensic evidence such as, the presence of skin under her 
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defendants who plead not guilty generally do so on the ground that the complainant 
consented and/or that the defendant lacked the necessary mens rea regarding the 
complainant’s consent. An analysis of Irish rape trial transcripts in 2009 revealed that consent 
represented the primary defence strategy in eighteen of the twenty-eight cases in which it was 
possible to ascertain the principal defence tactic.3 Despite the centrality of consent, the 
concept has not been statutorily defined in Irish rape law.  The guidance which exists hails 
largely from case-law and provides little elucidation on what is necessary for a valid consent 
to sexual activity. In this respect, Irish law lags behind other common law jurisdictions such 
as England and Wales, Canada, New South Wales and Victoria who have opted to provide 
legislative clarification of the meaning of consent.4  
 
The Irish government has promised a Sexual Offences Bill will be published in the near 
future.5 In light of this, this article proposes the introduction of a legislative definition of 
consent which should form part of any prospective legislation. It is argued that the common 
law on consent must be replaced with a modernised positive statutory definition. This will 
produce both symbolic and practical benefits. Symbolically, it introduces a rich definition 
which sends a clear message regarding what is necessary for a legally valid consent to sexual 
activity. Practically, statutory clarification can contribute to minimising the difficulties of 
proving an absence of consent in rape trials by providing better guidance for jurors when they 
are deliberating about consent. The reforms proposed here are influenced primarily by the 
English Sexual Offences Act 2003 and an analysis of the relevant provisions of this Act will 
be provided. However, whilst the English legislation provides a template for reform, it will be 
seen that there are some shortcomings in that jurisdiction’s approach to defining consent and 
recommendations for avoiding similar problems in an Irish context are discussed. In this way, 
the article also serves as a critique of the current English law in this area. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
nails, or his hair or saliva on her body: A. McColgan, The Case for Taking the Date out of Rape (Pandora Press: 
Hammersmith, 1996) 78.  
3 C. Hanly et al, Rape & Justice in Ireland: A National Study of Survivor, Prosecutor and Court Responses to 
Rape (The Liffey Press: Dublin, 2009) 345.  
4 Consent has been statutorily defined in England and Wales (The Sexual Offences Act 2003, ss. 74-76); Canada 
(the Canadian Criminal Code, ss. 265 and 273) and the Australian jurisdictions of Victoria (the Crimes Act 
1958, s. 36) and New South Wales (the Crimes Act 1900, s. 61HA).  
5 A date for publication of a Bill has yet to be announced but the Department of Justice has been engaging in a 
review of Irish sexual offences law (http://www.inis.gov.ie/en/JELR/Pages/SP12000300: last accessed: 20th 
August 2013).  
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The current definition of consent in Irish rape law 
Section 2(1) of the Criminal Law (Rape) Act 1981 defines rape as ‘sexual intercourse with a 
woman6 who at the time of the intercourse does not consent to it’. This article focuses on 
defining consent in the context of rape in section 2, as opposed to the other non-consensual 
sexual offences against adults.7 This is justified on the basis that the current rules on consent 
were developed largely with reference the definition of rape in section 2. In addition, the 
objective of this discussion is solely upon defining consent (as opposed to examining other 
elements of sexual offences such as mens rea8). This is best achieved by assessing consent 
with reference to rape only, particularly as this is the offence with which issues of consent are 
most closely aligned. The definition proposed here could be equally applied to the other non-
consensual sexual offences against adults. Indeed, in England this is precisely what has 
happened9 and it is envisaged that a similar approach should apply in Ireland.  
 
The current common law rules on consent are outdated, with some rules hailing from cases 
which were decided as far back as the late nineteenth century. Also, as the discussion below 
demonstrates, many of the current rules have been directly adopted from English case-law, 
with English authorities being relied upon as representing the Irish legal position. Indeed, 
given the lack of reported Irish judgments considering how to define consent in Irish law, 
English authorities are traditionally used in order to elucidate upon the concept in Irish law. 
Perhaps the central Irish authority on consent is The People (DPP) v C10 where Murray J. 
described consent as: 
 
                                                          
6 The definition of rape in section 2 is gender specific, that is, it punishes only the rape of a woman by a man. 
Consequently, the discussion here uses the feminine gender when referring to complainants and the male gender 
when referring to defendants. This is not to deny the existence of male rape or the fact that women may also 
commit sexual offences. Rather, it simply reflects the definition of the offence of rape in section 2.  
7 That is, rape under section 4, aggravated sexual assault or sexual assault: Criminal Law (Rape) (Amendment) 
Act 1990, ss. 2, 3 and 4, respectively.  
8 A defendant canot be found guilty of rape unless the requisite mens rea of rape is also proven. Section 2 also 
discusses the mens rea of rape, that is, intention or recklessness regarding the complainant’s absence of consent 
and the absence of the defence of honest belief in consent. However, the discussion in this article will focus on 
the definition of consent alone. For discussion of reform of the honest belief defence in Ireland, see: S. Leahy, 
‘When Honest is not Good Enough: The Need for Reform of the Honest Belief Defence in Irish Rape Law’ 
(2013) 23(1) Irish Criminal Law Journal 2. 
9 In the Sexual Offences Act 2003, the definition of consent applies to all four non-consensual sexual offences 
against adults in that Act: see ss. 1-4.   
10 [2001] 3 IR 345. 
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…voluntary agreement or acquiescence to sexual intercourse by a person of the age of 
consent with the requisite mental capacity. Knowledge or understanding of facts 
material to the act being consented to is necessary for the consent to be voluntary or 
constitute acquiescence.11  
 
The primary requirements for a legally valid consent to sexual intercourse are voluntariness, 
capacity and knowledge of relevant facts. 
 
Voluntariness 
Consent to sexual activity must be given freely. Where participation in sexual intercourse is 
secured as a result of violence or the threat of violence, any apparent consent will be vitiated. 
It is not necessary to show that the complainant offered resistance to the efforts of her 
attacker. Section 9 of the Criminal Law (Rape) (Amendment) Act 1990 which states that: 
 
... in relation to an offence that consists of or includes the doing of an act to a person 
without the consent of that person any failure or omission on the part of that person to 
offer resistance to the act does not of itself constitute consent to the act. 
 
In practice, notwithstanding section 9, a failure to offer resistance is likely to be taken into 
account by a jury as evidence from which consent may be inferred.12 In the absence of 
obvious signs of physical injury, the prosecution could experience difficulty in proving that 
the complainant did not consent.13 Given that the majority of rapes involve minimal physical 
injury14, such difficulties of proof will feature in a lot of cases.  
 
                                                          
11 [2001] 3 IR 345, 360. 
12 C. Hanly, An Introduction to Irish Criminal Law, 2nd edn (Gill & MacMillan: Dublin, 2006) 285. 
13 National Women’s Council of Ireland, Report of the Working Party on the Legal and Judicial Process for 
Victims of Sexual and other Crimes of Violence against Women and Children (National Women’s Council of 
Ireland: Dublin, 1996) 79. 
14 In Rape & Justice in Ireland, interviews with rape victims, assessments of DPP files and a case-tracking 
exercise all found that physical injuries, where sustained, were relatively minor (e.g.  bruises, cuts and 
scratches). For example, forty-four per cent of the victims interviewed reported sustaining relatively minor 




In the English case of R v Olugboja, it was made clear that an apparent consent may be 
vitiated by fear of adverse consequences other than physical violence.15 The Court of Appeal 
held that in determining whether a threat of adverse consequences was sufficient to vitiate an 
apparent consent the jury should reach their decision ‘by applying their combined good sense, 
experience and knowledge of human nature and modern behaviour to all the relevant facts of 
the case’.16 In light of this statement, it would appear that jurors have considerable latitude to 
determine what may be categorised as a threat which is sufficient to vitiate consent. Jurors are 
not confined to any particular definition of threat and are at liberty to assess each individual 
case on its merits.  Nevertheless, in practice, this latitude is unlikely to translate into a 
broadened understanding of the types of coercion which are contra-indicative of a valid 
consent.  The net effect of the failure to provide express guidance on the types of threats 
which might vitiate consent is that ‘much oppressive behaviour is likely to go unpunished’17, 
that is, that it will not be categorised as impeding consent. As Temkin comments, neither 
prosecutors nor juries can be expected to stray far from common understandings of rape as 
forcible compulsion.18 Much of this reluctance may be attributed to social acceptance of the 
‘real rape’ stereotype which suggests that genuine allegations involve physical violence or the 
threat thereof.  For example, Ellison and Munro found that in mock jury studies involving a 
rape scenario where the complainant showed no signs of physical injury, jurors ‘routinely 
emphasized the significance of this to their not guilty verdicts’.19 For jurors who are 
influenced by this type of thinking, a definitive statement that threats other than those of 





                                                          
15 [1982] QB 320. This case is accepted as representing the law in Ireland also. O’Malley notes that the Irish 
case of DPP v Reid [1993] 2 IR 186 involved very similar facts and though consent was not discussed in the 
appeal judgment, it appears that it was uncontested that consent would be vitiated in such circumstances: T. 
O’Malley, Sexual Offences, 2nd edn (Round Hall: Dublin, 2013) 41. 
16 [1982] QB 320, 332. 
17 See Temkin, above n. 2 at 93. 
18 Ibid. 
19 L. Ellison & V.E. Munro, ‘Jury Deliberation and Complainant Credibility in Rape Trials’ in C. McGlynn, & 
V.E. Munro, Rethinking Rape Law: International and Comparative Perspectives (Routledge: Oxfordshire, 




In order to legally consent to sexual intercourse, an individual must have attained the legal 
age of consent (i.e. seventeen years)20 and must not be suffering from a mental incapacity.21 
The individual must also not be affected by transient incapacity such as sleep or 
unconsciousness22 when the intercourse took place. Intoxication may affect an individual’s 
capacity to consent. However, it is not an automatic assumption that an intoxicated individual 
is legally incapable of consenting. The issue is not whether the complainant was intoxicated 
per se, but whether she was so intoxicated as to be incapable of consenting.23 Assessments 
like this are difficult to make. Thus, where a complainant is intoxicated short of 
unconsciousness it may be difficult to prove that her consent was absent. Complainant 
intoxication is a feature of a lot of rape trials. In 2009, a case-tracking exercise which 
examined one hundred rape cases found that seventy-eight per cent of complainants were 
intoxicated at the time of the attack.24 A similar study of one hundred and seventy-three rape 
case files which was conducted for the attrition study, Rape & Justice in Ireland, revealed 
that nearly two-thirds of the complainants in those cases had engaged in what is officially 
classified as ‘binge-drinking’ prior to the incident in question.25 In light of these statistics, it 
appears that the absence of more definitive guidance on the effect of intoxication upon an 
individual’s capacity to consent is likely to contribute to difficulties of proof in a substantial 
number of rape trials. 
 
Knowledge 
For consent to represent a genuine choice, the complainant must have had knowledge of all 
relevant information. If her consent has been procured as a result of a fundamental deceit, it is 
                                                          
20 See the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 2006, ss. 2-3.  
21 See the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 1993, s. 5.  Since sexual activity with children and individuals 
who are suffering from mental incapacity are not dealt with under the offence of rape as defined in section 2 of 
the 1981 Act, these forms of incapacity are not relevant for the purposes of the current discussion. 
22 R v Mayers (1872) 12 Cox CC 311; R v Larter & Castleton [1995] Criminal Law Review 75. Again, these 
English authorities are relied upon as there is no reported Irish case discussing intoxicated consent. However, 
O’Malley notes that there have been convictions for rape where defendants have had sex with sleeping 
complainants, namely, DPP v Y(N) [2002] 4 IR 309 and People (DPP) v Keane [2008] 3 IR 177. Both of these 
appeal cases focused on sentencing issues but it is clear from the judgments that the absence of consent where 
the complainant is sleeping was uncontested: See O’Malley, above n. 15 at 48. 
23 R v Lang (1976) 62 Cr App R 50. 
24 M. Corr, et al, Different Systems, Similar Outcomes?: Tracking Attrition in Reported Rape Cases in Eleven 
Countries, Country Briefing: Ireland (Child and Woman Abuse Studies Unit: London, 2009) 4. 
25 See Hanly et al, above n. 3 at 272. 
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invalid.26 The deception must, however, be fundamental. Consequently, consent will only be 
deemed to have been absent where the complainant has been deceived as to the identity of her 
partner27 or as to the nature of the act (i.e. where the complainant does not realise that she is 
engaging in sexual intercourse).28  
 
Currently, Irish law is unclear as to whether fraud as to the purpose of sexual intercourse 
vitiates consent. It is possible that an individual could be deceived as to the purpose of sexual 
intercourse if a trusted professional such as a psychologist or counsellor were to suggest that 
sexual intercourse would be beneficial for treatment purposes.29 However, it is perhaps most 
likely that this would arise in sexual assault cases. An example of such fraud would be where 
a healthcare worker who carries out a procedure such as a breast check or a vaginal 
examination on the basis that this is necessary for diagnostic or therapeutic purposes when in 
fact it is carried out for the healthcare professional’s sexual gratification. A similar example 
would arise where an individual induces another into consenting to such a procedure on the 
basis that he is a medical professional when in fact he holds no such qualification. Some 
guidance on the latter scenario may be taken from the English case of R v Tabassum.30 The 
defendant falsely represented himself as a breast cancer specialist and in this context women 
consented to his examining their breasts. All of the women testified that that if they had 
known that he was not a specialist they would not have consented to the examinations. Thus, 
their consent was held not to be valid. To date in Ireland there has been no case which 
involved this type of fraud. In light of the influence of English authorities in this area, it is 
quite likely that a similar approach to Tabassum would be adopted in this jurisdiction. 
However, legislative clarification of this point would be beneficial. There is a potential for 
                                                          
26 P. Charleton et al, Criminal Law (Butterworths: Dublin, 1999) 632. 
27 People (DPP) v C [2001] 3 IR 345. 
28 An example of such a case is the English case R v Flattery (1877) 2 QBD 410 where the defendant had sexual 
intercourse with a girl while pretending to perform surgery. The complainant thought that what was taking place 
was a surgical operation, believing that penetration was being effected with the defendant’s hand or with an 
instrument. It was held that as the woman was unaware of the nature of the activity, she could not have given a 
valid consent.  A similar situation arose in another English case, R v Williams (1923) 1 KB 340, where the 
defendant had sex with the complainant on the pretext that he was improving her singing voice by making an air 
passage. Because the complainant was deceived as to the nature of the act which was being performed on her, 
her apparent consent was vitiated.   
29 Of course, any trusted individual (such as a religious adviser or a social worker) could perpetrate a similar 
fraud (i.e. suggesting that sexual intercourse would be beneficial for the purposes of treatment of some mental 
condition). However, it is perhaps most likely that such a fraud would be operative in the context of mental 
health or medical treatment. 
30 [2000] 2 Cr App R 328. 
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sexual fraud cases not to be taken seriously by juries. Jurors may be inclined to view such 
cases as opportunist seductions or, at best, unfortunate situations which fall short of being 
labelled as sexual offences. Mock jury research has shown that jurors have a propensity to be 
circumspect about what constitutes a ‘real rape’.31 Sexual fraud may not meet stereotypical 
assumptions about the types of non-consensual sexual activity which should attract criminal 
liability. Thus, legislative clarification that such frauds are serious violations of sexual 
autonomy which are worthy of the sanction of the criminal law would provide an incentive 
for jurors to take sexual fraud seriously.  
 
The problems posed by the current approach to defining consent in Irish rape law 
The current Irish legal guidance on consent is both vague and stagnant. Although this 
ambiguity in theory permits flexibility for the definition of consent to evolve incrementally 
on a case-by-case basis, the Irish courts have not taken advantage of this. This lack of clarity 
has the propensity to contribute to difficulties of proving an absence of consent in ‘hard 
cases’ where the facts do not align with the traditional narrow understandings of force, fear, 
fraud or incapacity. In such cases, it will be difficult for the prosecution to prove that the 
complainant has been subjected to non-consensual sexual activity.  For example, in theory, a 
threat of adverse consequence such as job loss could be capable of vitiating an apparent 
consent. However, in practice, it is unclear whether a trial judge would direct a jury that such 
coercion is worthy of the attention of the criminal law. While jurors may believe that the 
defendant’s conduct in such a case is immoral, they might baulk at finding that a complainant 
could not give a legally valid consent in these situations unless this option is expressly 
provided to them by the law.  
 
A definitive legislative statement of the prerequisites for a valid consent to sexual activity 
could contribute to minimising trial judges’ problems when directing the jury in difficult 
                                                          
31 English mock jury studies have revealed the influence of the ‘real rape’ stereotype on juror deliberations: see 
J. Temkin and B. Krahé, Sexual Assault and the Justice Gap: A Question of Attitude (Hart Publishing: Oxford, 
2008), 48. Victim-blaming attitudes have also been shown to be influential: E. Finch and V.E. Munro, ‘The 
Demon Drink and the Demonized Woman: Socio-Sexual Stereotypes and Responsibility Attribution in Rape 




cases, as well as helping the prosecution to show that the complainant did not consent. It is 
arguable that such a definition is unnecessary. In general, there is an absence of a clear 
definition of consent in criminal law so it may be questioned why statutory clarification is 
necessary in the context of rape. The justification is that rape is sui generis. First, the low 
conviction rate for rape is controversial. In the period between 2005 and 2007, the conviction 
rate for rape was recorded as eight per cent of reports.32 It is important that the legislature is 
seen to have done everything in its power to contribute to improving these statistics. To date, 
this effort has been lacking and, given the centrality of consent in rape trials, reconsidering 
the law would seem to be an important and necessary effort to improve upon the current 
performance of the criminal justice system in this area. The second reason why consent is in 
need of reconsideration is the myriad of underlying societal influences which contribute to 
the difficulties of proving an absence of consent in rape trials. It is generally well-accepted 
amongst rape law scholars that such attitudes or ‘rape myths’ create unrealistic expectations 
about rape in society generally and necessarily also in the minds of jurors.33 Examples of 
these myths include the ‘real rape’ stereotype which suggests that the only genuine allegation 
of rape is that which involves a stranger in a public place and which is accompanied by 
significant physical force.34 Similar to the stereotype of the real rape, there appears to be a 
societal ideal of the ‘real victim’ which has created an imagery of the ‘deserving victim’ who 
has not engaged in what are seen as risky behaviours such as drinking to excess or dressing 
                                                          
32 See Corr et al, above n. 24 at 3. 
33 The influence of rape myths upon juror deliberations was first identified by feminist writers: See S. Estrich, 
Real Rape: How the Legal System Victimizes Women Who Say No (Harvard University Press: Harvard, 1987); S. 
Lees, Carnal Knowledge: Rape on Trial, 2nd edn, (The Women’s Press Ltd: London, 2002); Temkin, above n.2. 
For acceptance of this view amongst Irish academics whose work is not feminist in orientation, see: C. Fennell, 
‘Criminal Law and the Criminal Justice System: Woman as Victim’ in A. Connelly (ed), Gender and the Law in 
Ireland (Oak Tree Press: Dublin, 1993) 153; T. O’Malley, Sexual Offences: Law, Policy & Punishment (Round 
Hall, Sweet & Maxwell: Dublin, 1996) 1; C. McCullagh, Crime in Ireland: A Sociological Introduction (Cork 
University Press: Cork, 1996) 107; M.E. Ring, ‘Trial and Error: Current Problems in the Trial of Sexual 
Offences: A Prosecutor’s Perspective’ (2003) 13 Irish Criminal Law Journal 3, 5; Hanly et al, above n. 3 at 15; 
S. Leahy, 'Bad Laws or Bad Attitudes? Assessing the Impact of Societal Attitudes upon the Conviction Rate for 
Rape in Ireland' (2014) 14(1) Irish Journal of Applied Social Studies 17. 
34 Empirical research has, however, revealed that this stereotype is quite at odds with the reality of rape. 
According to the National Statistics published by the Rape Crisis Network of Ireland for 2010, the most likely 
perpetrators of sexual violence against adults are friends, neighbours or acquaintances (38.9 per cent of cases) 
and current or ex-partners (27.7 per cent of cases). Sexual violence against adults was committed by a stranger 
in only twelve per cent of cases:  M. Lyons, National Rape Crisis Statistics and Annual Report 2010, (Rape 
Crisis Network of Ireland: Galway, 2011) 39. In addition, in the analysis of Central Criminal Court files which 
was conducted by Hanly et al, it was found that nearly three-quarters of the incidents in which the location was 
specified occurred in a private place or vehicle: Hanly et al, above n. 3 at 269. This study also revealed that 
usually where physical injuries were reported, they tended to be relatively minor in nature. Only a small 
minority of complainants reported serious injuries such as broken bones (3.7 per cent), strangulation marks 
(2.78 per cent) and knife wounds (2.78 per cent): Hanly et al, above n. 3 at 274. 
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provocatively at the time of the alleged attack.35 A strong legislative statement on consent can 
serve a normative purpose and contribute to counter-acting these stereotypes by sending a 
positive message about what constitutes appropriate socio-sexual behaviour. In this way, 
legislatively defining consent can have a powerful symbolic effect. 
 
Proposals for legislatively defining consent in Irish rape law 
The Irish legislature should introduce a definition of consent which is similar to that 
contained in the English Sexual Offences Act 2003. The English law is chosen as a template 
for two reasons. First, prior to the recent reforms, the English rules on consent were virtually 
identical to the current Irish law. Since the English reformers faced similar difficulties to 
those which are currently experienced in Ireland, their approach to law reform provides 
important guidance for reform in this jurisdiction. Second, the English reforms are valuable 
because they are the product of considerable debate and consultation and are influenced by 
best practice from other common law jurisdictions.36 The 2003 Act introduced a two-tiered 
definition of consent.37 The first tier, enunciated in section 74, consists of a statutory 
definition of consent and represents a clear statement of what is necessary for a legally valid 
consent to sexual activity. The second tier may be found in sections 75 and 76 which 
comprise, respectively, of evidential and conclusive presumptions regarding the absence of 
consent.38 The second tier elucidates upon the first tier by setting out circumstances where 
consent cannot be said to be present.  
                                                          
35 Evidence of the existence of this stereotype in an Irish context may be gleaned from an attitude survey which 
was conducted by the Irish Examiner newspaper in 2008. Thirty-three per cent of respondents felt that a woman 
who had consumed alcohol or taken illicit drugs was partially responsible if she is raped. Eight per cent thought 
that she is totally at fault. Thirty-seven per cent of respondents felt that flirting extensively with the defendant 
made a woman in some way responsible for any subsequent attack and twenty-six per cent felt that a woman 
who was raped while wearing sexy or revealing clothing was in some way responsible for rape: C. Ryan, ‘Rape: 
Our Blame Culture’ Irish Examiner, 26th March 2008. 
36 Law Commission, Consent in Sexual Offences (Law Commission: London, 2000); Home Office, Setting the 
Boundaries: Reforming the Law on Sexual Offences (Home Office: London, 2000); Home Office, Protecting the 
Public: strengthening protection against sex offenders and reforming the law on sexual offences (Home Office: 
London, 2002).  
37 This new definition applies to four newly defined non-consensual sexual offences against adults, namely, 
rape, assault by penetration, sexual assault and causing a person to engage in sexual activity without consent: 
see the Sexual Offences Act 2003, ss.1-4, respectively.  
38 It must be noted that these presumptions also apply to honest belief in consent defence, that is, the mens rea of 
the relevant sexual offences. Thus, if the presumptions apply it will be presumed (either on a conclusive or an 
evidential basis) that the complainant did not consent and that the defendant did not honestly believe that she 
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The first tier of the legislative definition: defining consent 
Section 74 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 provides that ‘...a person consents if he agrees by 
choice and has the freedom and capacity to make that choice’. This seems like a simple 
statement. However, upon closer examination, it is clear that this is far from the case. Most 
notably, section 74 may be seen as introducing the standard of communicative sexuality into 
English law. In addition, the requirements of ‘choice’, ‘freedom’ and ‘capacity’ represent a 
positive statement which sets out the minimum prerequisites for a valid consent to sexual 
activity. This may be contrasted with the understanding of consent in common law39 where 
the concept is defined negatively with reference to factors which vitiate an apparent consent.  
 
The significance of incorporating the ideal of communicative sexuality into law 
On a literal interpretation of section 74, it is not obvious that it introduces communicative 
sexuality into English law, much less what the connotations of this concept are. However, 
there is an acceptance within contemporary legal scholarship on sexual offences that framing 
a definition of consent in terms of ‘free agreement’ is indicative of the adoption of the 
communicative sexuality standard.40  
 
On a principled level, communicative sexuality can be understood as a standard of acceptable 
sexual behaviour against which rape allegations may be judged. It requires mutuality and 
communication in sexual encounters so that both parties are afforded an opportunity to 
exercise genuine sexual choice. The notion of communicative sexuality was originally 
posited by feminist theorist Lois Pineau41 who sought to promote a new method of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
was consenting. Since this article is focused upon the definition of consent, a discussion of the implication of 
using presumptions in relation to honest belief is beyond the scope of the discussion here.  
39 See the discussion of the Irish law above.  
40 Section 74 requires that an individual who agrees to engage in sexual activity ‘has the freedom and capacity to 
make that choice’. Commenting prior to the introduction of section 74, Rumney stated that a definition of 
consent which centres on ‘free agreement’ signifies a commitment to communicative sexuality because the 
essence of ‘free agreement’ is communication of desires, likes and dislikes in the absence of force, coercion or 
fraud: P.N.S. Rumney, ‘The Review of Sexual Offences and Rape: Another False Dawn’ (2001) 64 Modern 
Law Review 890, 898-899. See also: V.E. Munro, ‘Constructing Consent: Legislating Freedom and Legitimating 
Constraint in the Expression of Sexual Autonomy’ (2008) 41 Akron Law Review 923, 944 and G. Firth, ‘Not an 
Invitation to Rape; the Sexual Offences Act 2003, Consent and the Case of the “Drunken” Victim’ (2011) 
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 99, 103. 
41 L. Pineau, ‘Date Rape: A Feminist Analysis’ (1989) 8 Law and Philosophy 217. 
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adjudicating upon rape allegations. Her solution was communicative sexuality which would 
create a ‘minimum standard of sexual decency’.42 She suggested that deviations from this 
standard should put the jury on alert that the complainant is unlikely to have consented. In 
practice, a definition of consent which centres on communicative sexuality encourages a 
context-sensitive approach when examining the facts of an alleged rape. Jurors are directed to 
examine the event in a holistic way in order to assess whether the situation represented an 
opportunity for genuine sexual choice. For example, jurors will be asked to assess whether 
the complainant was free to communicate her consent or whether there were coercive 
circumstances which made this impossible.  This marks a break with the approach to juror 
deliberations about consent that is fostered by the common law rules. The latter tend to create 
a presumption of consent. Jurors must determine whether consent was absent with reference 
to the narrowly defined understandings of force, fear, fraud or incapacity. The practical effect 
is that the complainant is presumed to have consented until one of these vitiating factors is 
proved by the prosecution. This presumption of consent discourages jurors from engaging in 
a nuanced assessment of the context within which the encounter occurred in order to 
determine whether it presented a genuine opportunity for the complainant to exercise sexual 
choice. Rather, knee-jerk assessments about consent are based upon the presence or absence 
of the traditional vitiating factors.43 The tendency for jurors to make ill-considered and hasty 
determinations about consent is compounded by their propensity to be influenced by 
prejudicial and erroneous societal attitudes about rape. The impact of rape myths upon juror 
deliberations in rape trials is similar to that of the presumption of consent that is created by 
the negative common law definition of consent. Instead of dispassionately judging cases on 
their merits, jurors are making spontaneous decisions about consent which are concentrated 
upon the absence of the stereotypical hallmarks of the ‘real rape’ or the ‘real victim’.44   
 
The ideal of communicative sexuality serves to off-set both the presumption of consent which 
is fostered by the common law rules and the effects of rape myth acceptance. Under this 
                                                          
42 V. Davion, ‘The Difference Debate: Rape and Moral Responsibility’ in K. Burgess-Jackson (ed), A Most 
Detestable Crime: New Philosophical Essays on Rape (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1999) 230. 
43 For example, a mock jury study has suggested that claims of non-consensual sex that are not accompanied by 
evidence of physical force and attendant resistance are significantly less likely to be accredited as rape by jurors: 
L. Ellison and V.E. Munro, ‘Reacting to Rape: Exploring Mock Jurors’ Assessments of Complainant 
Credibility’ (2009) British Journal of Criminology 202, 206.  
44 The English mock jury studies which have revealed the influence of the ‘real rape’ stereotype on juror 
deliberations are listed above: Above n. 31.   
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model, such influences are less likely to affect jurors’ decision-making because attention is 
focused on the context of the encounter to decipher whether it is one which the complainant 
is likely to have consented to. Instead of seeking the presence of one of the traditional 
narrowly defined vitiating factors, the jury must look for evidence which suggests that the 
sexual encounter was welcomed by the complainant. Likewise, rather than making a 
spontaneous and prejudicial assessment of the circumstances of her allegation on the basis 
that it does not conform to stereotypical societal ideals about rape, jurors will be directed to 
focus only on the context of the case which is before them.  
 
The adoption of a communicative sexuality standard when defining consent could ameliorate 
the difficulties of proof in rape trials where consent is in issue. Admittedly, the significance 
of couching a definition of consent in terms of ‘free agreement’ is not immediately apparent 
from the wording of section 74. Realisation of the ideal of communicative sexuality in 
practice will require considerable effort in the form of judicial interpretation and direction. To 
aid this process, judges who hear rape cases must be trained on how to interpret and apply the 
new definition of consent so that the goals of communicative sexuality are realised. 
Naturally, judicial training raises both financial concerns45 and a considerable administrative 
burden. However, once the Irish Judicial Council is placed on a permanent statutory 
footing46, such training should be more straightforward to implement. Although by no means 
uncontroversial or infallible47, recent English research has suggested that such training is 
well-received by the judiciary and can aid them in applying challenging areas of the law. 
Rumney and Fenton assessed the Serious Sexual Offences Seminar which is mandatory for 
English judges who hear sexual offence cases.48 The research found that the information 
                                                          
45 The lack of available funding for judicial education and training is cited on the Judicial Council website: 
http://www.aji.ie/supports/judicial_education (last accessed: 29 September 2013) 
46 The Judicial Council Bill 2010 has yet to be implemented into law. 
47 See Temkin and Krahé, above n. 31 at 188-192. 
48 English judges who are ‘ticketed’ to hear sexual offences cases must complete this seminar once every three 
years. The training is provided by the Judicial Council (previously the Judicial Studies Board) and comprises of 
a three-day residential course. Lectures given during the training are delivered by individuals from a number of 
backgrounds including both legal professionals and academics as well as medical professionals and those from 
social science and psychological backgrounds: P.N.S. Rumney and R.A. Fenton, ‘Judicial Training and Rape’ 
(2011) 75 Journal of Criminal Law 473, 474-475. Rumney and Fenton interviewed the former and current 
course director of the programme and analysed some of the materials provided to judges during the training.  
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imparted during this training has influenced judicial decision-making.49 Another initiative 
which might aid judges and is perhaps more feasible and less costly than training is the 
introduction of a bench book which provides instructions on how best to direct the jury in 
rape trials. This bench book could be modelled upon the English Crown Court Bench Book.50 
The latter sets out model directions which trial judges can use when instructing jurors on how 
to approach their deliberations about consent. In Ireland, a similar publication could show 
trial judges how to impart the message of communicative sexuality to jurors. Although such a 
publication must respect the independence of the judiciary and cannot prescribe how the law 
should be applied, it can offer valuable guidance to trial judges on how to explain the new 
law to the jury. While trial judges will certainly not be obliged to refer to the bench book and 
are free to tailor the suggested directions as they see fit, it is likely that they would make use 
of any available assistance in performing the difficult task of providing a balanced direction 
to the jury in a rape trial.  
 
The importance of positively defining consent  
The requirements of ‘choice’, ‘freedom’ and ‘capacity’ represent the minimum requirements 
for a valid consent under section 74. After the introduction of section 74, there was some 
evidence that moving to a positive definition of consent promoted a broader interpretation of 
the circumstances which are contraindicative of consent. Perhaps most notably, in R v 
Jheeta51, the new definition seems to have emboldened the English judiciary to adopt a more 
liberal understanding of the types of fraud which might prevent a complainant from being 
able to freely agree to sexual activity. The case concerned a defendant who had anonymously 
sent threatening text messages to the complainant, his ex-girlfriend. She consulted the 
defendant who told her that he would inform the police. He then texted the complainant, 
pretending to be the police, and in these messages he told the complainant that she should 
continue to have sex with the defendant or else she would have to pay a fine for causing him 
                                                          
49 Rumney and Fenton found that some of the sociological perspectives on rape provided during the training had 
been used in judgments and that the training on the use of sexual experience evidence was also influential in 
subsequent judicial practice: Ibid. at 479. 
50 This bench book, published by the Judicial Studies Board in March 2010, provides guidance for judges when 
directing the jury and contains a chapter on sexual offence cases. Although there is currently no equivalent 
publication in Ireland, it is possible that such a publication could be commissioned by the Judicial Studies 
Committee of the interim Judicial Council.  
51 [2007] EWCA Crim 1699. 
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distress. The complainant alleged that she had sex with the defendant on numerous occasions, 
solely as a result of what she erroneously believed to be police advice. The Court concluded 
that this was not a free choice or consent for the purposes of the Act.52 Similarly, the recent 
case of R v McNally53 has confirmed that deception as to the gender of one’s partner can 
obviate a ‘free agreement’ to sex.  
 
Given the restrictive definition of fraud in common law, it is unlikely that the defendant’s 
actions in Jheeta would have been held capable of vitiating an apparent consent prior to the 
introduction of section 74. It is also unclear what stance the courts would have taken to 
deception as to gender. These cases demonstrate that positively requiring that the 
complainant be free to exercise choice can spark a fresh consideration of the types of fraud 
and deception that are incompatible with a valid consent. This more expansive understanding 
of sexual fraud may aid the prosecution in proving that consent was absent in situations 
where it may not previously have been possible to do so.  
 
Section 74 also encouraged English judges to reconsider how to deal with cases where the 
complainant was voluntarily intoxicated. In R v Bree54 Sir Igor Judge sent a clear message 
that intoxication short of unconsciousness may cause a complainant to lack the capacity to 
validly consent, whilst acknowledging the difficulties in reaching a decision regarding 
capacity in such cases: 
 
If, through drink (or for any other reason) the complainant has temporarily lost her 
capacity to choose whether to have intercourse on the relevant occasion, she is not 
consenting, and subject to questions about the defendant’s state of mind, if intercourse 
takes place, this would be rape. …as a matter of practical reality, capacity to consent 
may evaporate well before a complainant becomes unconscious. Whether this is so or 
                                                          
52 [2007] EWCA Crim 1699, para. 29. 
53 [2013] EWCA Crim 1051. This was a case involving assault by penetration. However, the interpretation of 
consent in section 74 is equally applicable to rape. For commentary see: G.A. Doig, ‘Deception as to gender 
vitiates consent’ (2013) Journal of Criminal Law 464.  
54 [2007] EWCA Crim 804. 
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not, however, is fact-specific, or more accurately, depends on the actual state of mind 
of the individuals involved on the particular occasion.55 
 
The reasoning in Bree was confirmed in R v Hysa56, where the court also highlighted that the 
prosecution does not need to show that the complainant was intoxicated to such a degree that 
she was incapable of communicating or offering physical resistance to the efforts of the 
defendant.57  
 
The foregoing indicates that, to a certain extent, the new approach to defining consent has 
emboldened the English judiciary to expand upon the types of scenarios which are 
incompatible with the freedom to exercise genuine sexual choice. Nevertheless, a lot of 
questions remain unanswered. For example, although the understanding of sexual fraud was 
expanded upon in Jheeta, the limits of this broadened understanding remain unclear.58 
Similarly, although Bree and Hysa illustrate the judiciary’s efforts to reconsider the problem 
of intoxicated consent in light of section 74, there is still little guidance for jurors deliberating 
in cases involving intoxication. Finally, there has been no comprehensive judicial 
consideration of the level of coercion which is incompatible with freedom to exercise genuine 
sexual choice.59 For example, it is difficult to predict what stance the courts would take where 
                                                          
55 [2007] EWCA Crim 804, para. 34.  
56 [2007] EWCA 2056. 
57 In this case, the trial judge had withdrawn the case from the jury because the prosecution could not say that 
the complainant did not say ‘yes’. The trial judge observed that, at its highest, the complainant’s evidence was 
that she did not think she would have consented. The Court of Appeal allowed the prosecution’s appeal against 
the trial judge’s ruling, noting that there was sufficient evidence to allow the jury to make a determination on 
capacity to consent: See P. Rook and R. Ward, Rook & Ward on Sexual Offences: Law & Practice, 4th edn 
(Sweet & Maxwell: London, 2010) 60. 
58 As Fitzpatrick comments, ‘questions remain as to whether any deception which brings about an instance of 
sexual intercourse which would not otherwise have taken place counts for the purposes of vitiating consent 
under section 74’: B. Fitzpatrick, ‘Rape: Consent’ (2008) 72 Journal of Criminal Law 11, 13. Similar confusion 
has arisen in the aftermath of the decision in R v McNally where a ‘common sense’ approach to determinations 
of when deception is sufficient to vitiate consent was advocated: [2013] EWCA Crim 1051, para. 25. Doig 
comments that this approach can result in the law remaining in an ‘uncertain and unsatisfactory state’: see Doig, 
above n. 53 at 468. 
59 Fitzpatrick has suggested that the decisions of R v Jheeta and R v Kirk provide some indication that the new 
definition of consent in section 74 has encouraged trial judges to adopt a broader understanding of the types of 
pressures that are incompatible with a free agreement to engage in sexual activity: see Fitzpatrick, above n. 58 at 
13. However, the focus of the court’s decision in R v Jheeta was fraud. Since there was no express discussion of 
threats, any conclusion on the relevance of the court’s decision for possible future interpretation of the term 
‘freedom’ must be treated with circumspection. Similarly, although the decision in R v Kirk [2008] EWCA Crim 
434 suggests that duress other than express threats of violence may be sufficient to vitiate consent, this case was 
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consent has been obtained by threats of adverse consequences such as job loss or withdrawal 
of financial support from an individual who is economically dependent on the defendant.  
 
Most recently, it has been suggested that it is possible to give a conditional consent to sexual 
activity and, if the relevant condition is breached, consent will be vitiated.60 Doig and 
Wortley note that English courts have ‘recognised that a woman is entitled to consent to 
sexual intercourse that her partner wears a condom61 or agrees not to ejaculate inside her 
vagina62’.63 As long as such a condition is communicated to the defendant, a deliberate 
decision by him to ignore it will give rise to criminal liability.64 The idea of conditional 
consent is a significant development which allows individuals to consent to sex on a 
particular basis.65 However, it is unclear as yet whether the concept of conditional consent 
will be extended to other situations66 (e.g. consent on the basis that one’s partner is not 
suffering from HIV).  
 
Although there have been some progressive interpretations of the definition of consent in 
section 74, much uncertainty continues to surround the precise meaning of, ‘choice’, 
‘freedom’ and ‘capacity’. Arguably, this ambiguity has undermined the potential benefits of 
the introduction of a positive definition of consent. Thus, to maximise the benefits of a 
positive definition of consent and ensure a consistent approach to interpreting what 
constitutes genuine sexual choice, it would be beneficial to provide meaningful guidance on 
the parameters of the requirements of choice, freedom and capacity. This has been lacking in 
the English reform effort. However, if a definition such as section 74 were to be adopted in 
Ireland, judicial training and bench book guidance could be used to demonstrate the potential 
benefits of the positive definition of consent to judges and ensure that these benefits are 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
decided prior to the introduction of the 2003 Act and thus is not a reliable guide to the likely judicial 
interpretation of section 74.   
60 See: Assange v Swedish Prosecution Authority [2011] EWHC 2849 (Admin) and R (on the application of F) v 
DPP [2013] EWHC 945 (Admin).  
61 Assange v Swedish Prosecution Authority [2011] EWHC 2849 (Admin) 
62 R (on the application of F) v DPP [2013] EWHC 945 (Admin) 
63 G.A. Doig and N. Wortley, ‘Conditional Consent? An Emerging Concept in the Law of Rape’ (2013) Journal 
of Criminal Law 286, 289.  
64 Ibid. 




realised. Accompanied by such measures, section 74 represents a sensible template for reform 
in Ireland.  By introducing the concept of communicative sexuality into law, the definition 
paves the way for a new approach to adjudications of consent in rape trials. This goal is 
furthered by the positive orientation of the definition which encourages jurors to look for 
signs of free agreement rather than seeking to fit the facts of the case within one of the 
narrowly defined vitiating factors which are used to determine the absence of consent under 
the common law. Of course, significant judicial effort will be required to ensure that the 
definition is progressively applied and correctly explained to juries. This will be facilitated by 
judicial training and bench book guidance, as well as the introduction of a second tier within 
the definition which further elucidates on when free agreement to sex will not be present.  
 
The second tier of the legislative definition: Elucidating upon the meaning of consent 
The second tier of the definition of consent serves two goals. It gives guidance on situations 
where consent is unlikely to be present, thereby providing clarity on the definition provided 
in the first tier. Also, it has the practical effect of establishing two routes by which an absence 
of consent may be proved. The first will be to bring the facts of the case within one of the 
scenarios listed in the second tier. In this situation, the jury must be directed to find that 
consent was absent. If the facts do not fit within any of the scenarios that are listed within the 
second tier, the prosecution must revert to the second route of proving the absence of consent. 
This involves demonstrating the absence of consent in the traditional way, with reference to 
the first tier. It is important to remember that the second tier is non-exhaustive. It provides an 
illumination of the types of situations where consent will be absent and shortens the 
prosecution’s process of proof in cases that fit within those paradigms. Cases that fall outside 
of this list can still, however, be dealt with by reference to the general definition of consent. 
  
The second tier proposed here is largely based upon the equivalent provisions in the 2003 
Act, that is, sections 75 and 76. However, there is one important difference. The list of 
circumstances included in sections 75 and 76 give rise, respectively, to evidential and 
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conclusive presumptions about consent.67 When these circumstances68 are proved consent 
will either be evidentially or conclusively presumed to be absent. This ‘presumptions’ 
method of structuring the second tier is a novel one and differs from the approach which 
other common law jurisdictions have adopted. The latter have all opted for the ‘list approach’ 
whereby the second tier consists of a list of situations where consent will be deemed to be 
absent.69 The structure proposed here eschews the presumptions approach in favour of the list 
approach. The use of presumptions is complex and is likely to cause confusion amongst 
jurors.70 The English provisions create a distinction between situations where consent will be 
conclusively presumed to be absent (i.e. essentially deemed to be absent) and those where 
there is a presumption that consent will be absent but this presumption may be rebutted by the 
defence. This adds an additional and unnecessary layer of complication to the rules.  
 
Also, the use of evidential presumptions in relation to some of the circumstances which will 
be included in the second tier arguably represents a retrograde step. In the 2003 Act, only 
sexual fraud gives rise to a conclusive presumption of non-consent. Other traditional common 
law vitiating factors such a physical force and sleep or unconsciousness raise only an 
evidential presumption of non-consent. Legislatively providing that such circumstances raise 
a presumption of non-consent, as opposed to being constitutive of a lack of consent would in 
fact compromise the protection of sexual autonomy which is offered at common law.71 
Certainly, it is possible that in situations where the complainant was asleep or even where 
force was used that consent might still have been present72 and in this sense an evidential 
                                                          
67 Sections 75 and 76 are also unique for applying to both consent and honest belief in consent, that is, the mens 
rea of the offence. Since this article is focused upon the definition of consent, a discussion of the implication of 
using presumptions in relation to honest belief is beyond the scope of the discussion here.  
68 The circumstances listed in both section 75 and 76 are discussed thematically later in this article. 
69 The list approach has been adopted in a number of common law jurisdictions, namely Scotland (Sexual 
Offences (Scotland) Act 2009, ss. 12-15), Canada (Canadian Criminal Code, ss. 265(3) and 273.1) and the 
Australian states of Victoria (Crimes Act 1958, s. 36) and New South Wales (Crimes Amendment (Consent-
Sexual Assault Offences) Act 2007, s. 61HA). 
70 Rook and Ward state that the evidential presumptions are still widely misunderstood: see Rook and Ward, 
above n. 57 at 62.  
71 In their consideration of reform of the Scots law of sexual offences, the Scottish Law Reform Commission 
argued that stating that the situations listed in section 75 of the 2003 Act were merely indicative of a lack of 
consent was an incorrect categorisation. The Commission expressed itself to be of the view that these situations 
are not concerned with evidence used to prove lack of consent but are rather facts which represent lack of 
consent: Scottish Law Commission, Report on Rape and Other Sexual Offences (Scottish Law Commission, 
2007) 25-26. 
72 A sleeping complainant may have been willing to engage in sexual activity with the defendant while sleeping. 
As regards force, sado-masochistic sexual activity may involve significance levels of force and still be 
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presumption may seem to be appropriate. However, such situations are likely to be rare and if 
they do come to the attention of the criminal justice system, an unfair conviction can be 
avoided by both prosecutorial discretion and the mens rea requirement.73 Moreover, the 
second tier should serve a normative function and send a clear message about appropriate 
socio-sexual behaviour. Arguably, this outweighs the marginal benefit which an evidential 
presumption might provide in these rare cases. Another potential problem with the use of 
presumptions is the risk of creating an apparent hierarchy of gravity, with the situations 
giving rise to conclusive presumptions of non-consent perhaps being viewed as more serious 
than those giving rise to evidential presumptions. For these reasons, it is proposed that the list 
approach is the preferable option for Irish reform. This view would seem to be supported by 
the fact that this is the approach which has been adopted in the majority of common law 
jurisdictions which have sought to define consent.74  
 
Having identified the list approach as the appropriate means of structuring of the second tier, 
the contents of that list must now be outlined, that is, the list of circumstances which should 
result in consent being deemed to be absent. The fact scenarios listed in sections 75 and 76 of 
the 2003 Act form a suitable template. The fact scenarios are discussed here thematically, 
with reference to the three necessary requirements of choice, freedom and capacity. Whilst it 
is recommended that some of the fact scenarios described in sections 75 and 76 should be 
adopted in full, in other instances some rephrasing is suggested. Additionally, it is proposed 
that some additional fact scenarios which are not found in sections 75 and 76 should be 
included in the second tier of the definition of consent in Irish law.  
 
Choice 
If an individual is to exercise genuine choice she must not have been deceived in any way. 
The relevant provisions in relation to this theme are to be found in section 76: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
consensual. Of course, even consent will not be a defence to sado-masochistic activity which results in actual 
bodily harm: R v Brown [1993] 2 All ER 75.  
73 A defendant who believed that his partner was consenting will not have the requisite mens rea for rape: 
Criminal Law (Rape) Act 1981, s. 2(2). 
74 Canada, New South Wales, Victoria and Scotland. 
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- the defendant intentionally deceived the complainant as to the nature or purpose of the 
relevant act75; or 
- the defendant intentionally induced the complainant to consent to the relevant act by 
impersonating a person known personally to the complainant76 
 
In the first scenario, the inclusion of fraud as to purpose broadens the reach of the law in this 
area. At common law, only fraud as to the nature of the act vitiates an apparent consent.77 The 
addition of purpose extends the law to cover situations where the complainant understands 
the nature of the act but is deceived as to its purpose (i.e. what the act is for).  In Jheeta78, the 
Court noted that this provision would apply where a complainant consents to an act believing 
it to be for medical purposes when really it is merely for the sexual gratification of the 
defendant.79 Similarly, in R v Piper80, it was held that there was fraud as to purpose where the 
complainant agreed to be measured for a bikini by the defendant on the understanding that 
this was necessary to determine her modelling potential when this was actually done for the 
sexual gratification of the defendant. Extending the understanding of fraud is to be 
welcomed. Cases like these represent a patent violation of an individual’s sexual autonomy 
and the law should clarify that this type of deception obviates a complainant’s ability to 
freely agree to sexual activity. 
 
The second scenario concerns fraud as to identity. This reflects the common law whereby 
there cannot be a valid consent to sexual activity where the complainant was deceived about 
the identity of her sexual partner.81 The provision is limited to impersonation of individuals 
who are ‘known personally’ to the complainant. As Ormerod comments, this phrasing is 
clearly intended to prevent the presumption arising when the defendant claims to be someone 
such a celebrity or other well-known figure with whom the complainant has no personal 
acquaintance but for whom the complainant may be expected to hold an attraction.82 Thus, it 
                                                          
75 The Sexual Offences Act 2003, s. 76(2)(a). 
76 The Sexual Offences Act 2003, s. 76(2)(b). 
77 R v Flattery (1877) 2 QBD 410; R v Williams (1923) 1 KB 340.  
78 [2007] EWCA 1699. 
79 [2007] EWCA 1699, para 26. 
80 [2007] EWCA Crim 2131. 
81 It is noteworthy that under English common law prior to the introduction of the 2003 Act the only 
impersonation which was sufficient to invalidate consent was impersonation of the complainant’s husband or 
regular sexual partner. Thus, this provision marked an extension of the English law.   
82 D. Ormerod, Smith & Hogan’s Criminal Law, 13th edn (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2011) 735. 
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would be confined to individuals whom the complainant would be familiar with in the course 
of her everyday life. 
 
Although extending the meaning of sexual fraud is to be welcomed as an exercise in statutory 
clarification, it is worth considering whether a future Irish definition of consent should adopt 
a more expansive definition in this area. In particular, it is necessary to contemplate whether 
express provision should be made for lesser deceptions, for example, where a complainant 
has sex with the defendant because he has deceived her as to his level of romantic attachment 
to her or made a false promise of some benefit such as job promotion or financial 
recompense. Naturally, there is nothing to prevent a court from relying on the general 
definition of consent in order to find that these sorts of deceptions vitiate an apparent consent 
to sex. However, given the courts’ tendency to take a cautious and restrictive approach when 
interpreting the factors which may vitiate an apparent consent, the impetus for development 
in this area will have to come from the legislature.  
 
Herring has suggested that the English provisions should be expressly extended to cover 
deceptions such as false declarations of love or false promises of marriage.83 In his view, 
restricting the information on which a person makes a choice can be as inhibiting of a free 
choice as making an option unattractive through a threat.84 Indeed, he suggests that in one 
sense deception can be regarded as worse than a threat because the deception uses the 
victim’s own decision-making powers against her; rendering her an instrument of harm 
against herself.85 Consequently, Herring recommends that consent should be deemed to be 
absent ‘where the complainant is mistaken as to a fact and had she known the truth about that 
fact she would not have consented to it’.86 Hence, consent would be vitiated whenever a 
                                                          
83 J. Herring, ‘Mistaken Sex’ [2005] Criminal Law Review 511, 515. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid. See also: A. Wertheimer, Consent to Sexual Relations (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2003) 
194. 
86 Herring suggests the formulation of a legal rule which provides that: 
If at the time of the sexual activity a person:  
(i) is mistaken as to a fact; and 
(ii) had she known the truth about that fact would not have consented to it 
then she did not consent to the sexual activity. If the defendant knows (or ought to know) that she did 
not consent (in the sense just described) then he is guilty of an offence:  
See Herring, above n. 83 at 517.  
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complainant was mistaken about any fact relating to sexual activity if her understanding of 
that fact was influential in her decision to consent. Thus, it would include the situation where 
the complainant consented to sexual activity because she believed that the defendant loved 
her or was going to marry her. Regardless of whether or not such an approach is morally 
appropriate, it is unsuitable for adoption into law for a number of reasons.  
 
First, deceptions other than those as to the nature and purpose of the act or the identity of 
one’s partner are generally not serious enough to warrant the imposition of liability for rape. 
As Wertheimer notes, ‘[w]e may think it sleazy if a male lies about his marital status, 
affections, or intentions in order to get a woman into bed, but many do not think that this is a 
particularly serious matter’.87 Whilst it is justifiable to impose criminal liability for rape in 
the case of fraud as to the nature or purpose of the act or the identity of one’s partner, other 
lesser deceptions do not warrant the same penal consequences.  
 
Second, frauds such as false declarations of love or fabricated promises of future benefits are 
difficult to prove. For example, it is difficult to show that the defendant’s declaration of love 
or promise is untruthful. He may have meant it at the time and subsequently changed his 
mind.88 Measuring the causal impact of the deception is also problematic. It may not be 
possible to show that the declaration or promise was the reason or at least a significant 
motivating factor in the complainant’s decision to consent.89 Even where the complainant has 
believed the deceptive statements and these statements have had a causal impact, the 
prosecution may not be able to demonstrate that this is so.90 Schulhofer notes that particularly 
where feelings, commitments, and relationships with third parties are concerned, there are 
few solid guides to determining what is material and what is ‘misrepresentation’, as opposed 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
The rephrasing recommended here is necessary to fit within the format of the second tier. 
87  See Wertheimer, above n. 85 at 193. Temkin makes a similar comment: J. Temkin, ‘Towards a Modern Law 
of Rape’ (1982) 45 Modern Law Review 399, 405. 
88 Schulhofer notes that it is difficult to distinguish between a false promise and a genuine change of heart: S.J. 
Schulhofer, ‘Taking Sexual Autonomy Seriously: Rape Law and Beyond’ (1992) 11 Law and Philosophy 35, 
90. 
89 See Wertheimer, above n. 85 at 201. 
90 Wertheimer notes that women often have sexual relations with men who do not say that they love them or 
intend to marry them: Ibid. at 201. Thus, it does not follow that because these statements were made, that they 
induced the complainant to consent. 
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to ‘puffing’ or ‘storytelling’.91 This is a valid point. It would be notoriously difficult to reach 
firm conclusions regarding deceptions other than those included in section 76. The most 
likely result of such difficulties of proof is that a rule regarding lesser deceptions would be 
rarely (if ever) used. It is hard to justify the creation of a provision which will be of little 
practical effect, particularly when lesser frauds may be dealt with under the general definition 
of consent if the need arises. As a result of these concerns, with regard to choice, the list of 
situations where consent would be deemed to be absent should be limited to those contained 
in the English legislation. 
 
Freedom 
To have freedom to consent one must be able to choose whether or not she will engage in 
sexual activity, free from external pressure or duress. The relevant provisions on this issue 
may be found in section 75, which refers to situations where: 
 
- any person was, at the time of the relevant act or immediately before it began, 
using violence against the complainant or causing the complainant to fear that 
immediate violence would be used against him92; 
- any person was, at the time of the relevant act or immediately before it began, 
causing the complainant to fear that violence was being used, or that immediate 
violence would be used, against another person93; or 
- the complainant was, and the defendant was not, unlawfully detained at the time 
of the relevant act.94 
 
The third scenario, which deals with the situation where the complainant is unlawfully 
detained and the defendant is at liberty, is uncontroversial. It is reasonable to assume that 
consent is absent in this scenario. It should be incorporated into the list of situations where 
consent will be deemed to be absent without any further discussion.  
                                                          
91 S.J. Schulhofer, Unwanted Sex: The Culture of Intimidation and the Failure of the Law (Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1998) 158. See also J. McGregor, Is it Rape? On Acquaintance Rape and Taking 
Women’s Consent Seriously (Ashgate Publishing Ltd: Aldershot, 2005) 185. 
92 The Sexual Offences Act 2003, s. 75(2)(a). 
93 The Sexual Offences Act 2003, s. 75(2)(b). 
94 The Sexual Offences Act 2003, s. 75(2)(c). 
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Since the two situations dealing with violence employ similar terminology they may be 
discussed together. Both subsections refer to ‘any person’. Thus, the violence does not have 
to have been used or threatened by the defendant. The fact that the defendant took advantage 
of violence caused or threatened by another will suffice. Similarly, violence or the threat 
thereof may be directed towards the complainant or a third party such as a family member of 
a friend.  
 
The provisions are, however, limited to situations involving ‘violence’ or threats of 
‘immediate violence’. ‘Violence’ has been interpreted as being restricted to acts of physical 
harm.95 In addition, the immediacy requirement seems to imply a fairly strict temporal 
limitation on the validity of a threat.  However, as Rook and Ward point out, there is no 
stipulation that the complainant’s fear of violence must be based on reasonable grounds. 
Although there has been no judicial decision on this point to date, it seems that an honest but 
unreasonable fear of immediate violence suffices.96  
 
Framing the provisions which relate to threats so as to exclude the situation where a 
complainant fears future violence is acceptable. In such a scenario the complainant will have 
an opportunity to seek help in the interim period. Should a case arise involving a threat of 
future violence where special circumstances exist which warrant a finding of non-consent, 
this could still be achieved with reference to the general definition.97 However, it is arguable 
that confining the provisions relating to freedom to threats of physical harm is unduly 
restrictive and that the second tier should provide greater guidance on other types of sexual 
coercion. 
 
Schulhofer suggests that any conduct that forces a person to choose between her sexual 
autonomy and any of her other legally protected entitlements (e.g. rights to property, to 
privacy, and to reputation) is by definition improper and should be treated as a serious 
                                                          
95 Ormerod notes that it is clear from the parliamentary debates that ‘violence’ was intended to be limited only 
to violence to the person: See Ormerod, above n. 82 at 735. 




criminal offence.98 There are a number of threats other than those of immediate violence 
which are serious enough to obviate one’s freedom to exercise sexual choice. Examples 
would include threats to: abduct or detain the complainant or a third party99 (e.g. the 
complainant’s child); expose a secret which would be highly damaging to the complainant’s 
interests100 or ; withdraw financial support where the complainant is wholly dependent upon 
the defendant for survival. Where a complainant submits to sexual intercourse under any of 
these circumstances, she does not freely agree. Whilst threats like these could be dealt with 
under a general definition of consent, it would be beneficial to provide some statutory 
incentive to extend the understanding of threats so as to recognise non-violent sexual 
coercion.  
 
Before the enactment of the 2003 Act, it was recommended that the situation ‘where a person 
submits or is unable to resist because of threats or fear of serious harm or serious detriment of 
any type to themselves or another person’ should be included in the second tier.101 This 
provision should be included in the list of situations where consent will be deemed to be 
absent in Irish law. Read along with the provisions on violence, this provision sends a clear 
message that threats of adverse consequences other than physical violence can interfere with 
one’s ability to freely exercise sexual choice. The flexibility of the terms ‘serious harm’ and 
‘serious detriment’ permits courts to interpret them on a case-by-case basis. This is important 
because the gravity of a threat cannot always be stated in abstract terms and often depends on 
the particularities of the person being threatened.102 Consider the example of a defendant who 
threatens a complainant with severe claustrophobia that he will lock her in a cupboard unless 
she agrees to have sex with him.103 Whilst looked at objectively the threat of being locked in 
a cupboard may not seem like a threat of serious harm, in the foregoing situation it may well 
meet that threshold.104 Similarly, the context in which a threat is made may influence the 
                                                          
98 See Schulhofer, above n. 91 at 132. 
99 See Temkin, above n. 2 at 101. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Home Office, Setting the Boundaries: Reforming the Law on Sexual Offences (Home Office: London, 2000), 
para. 2.10.9. 
102 See McGregor, above n. 91 at 167. 
103 A.P. Simester and G.R. Sullivan, Criminal Law: Theory & Doctrine, 3rd edn (Hart Publishing: Oxford, 2007) 
428. (This point is not made in the fourth edition) 
104 Of course, if the defendant is not aware of the complainant’s particular idiosyncrasy, it will not be fair to 
punish him for it. However, a person who subjects another to unwanted sex as a result of a wrongful threat of 
which he is unaware may be entitled to an acquittal on grounds that he lacked mens rea regarding the former’s 
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interpretation of its seriousness. For example, the threat of loss of employment might be far 
more grave if made in an environment where jobs are in scarce supply than one in which jobs 
are plentiful and the complainant will easily find another job.  
 
The inclusion of the word ‘serious’ as a precondition in relation to each of the terms will 
prevent more minor or trivial threats from being categorised as sufficient to interfere with 
one’s ability to freely agree to sexual activity. It is likely that trial judges will exercise care in 
recognising threats under this provision. Nonetheless, its inclusion should provide the 
momentum for a more expansive interpretation of the types of coercion which are sufficient 
to result in consent being deemed to be absent.  
 
Capacity 
An individual has capacity to consent if she can make a meaningful decision as to whether to 
engage in sexual activity. The relevant provisions on this issue in the 2003 Act are as follows: 
 
- the complainant was asleep or otherwise unconscious at the time of the relevant 
act105; 
- because of the complainant’s physical disability, the complainant would not have 
been able at the time of the relevant act to communicate to the defendant whether 
the complainant consented106; or 
- any person had administered or caused to be taken by the complainant, without the 
complainant’s consent, a substance, which, having regard to when it was 
administered or taken, was capable of causing or enabling the complainant to be 
stupefied or overpowered at the time of the relevant act107                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
The first provision which deems consent to be absent where the complainant was asleep or 
unconscious is uncontroversial and merely represents a statutory restatement of the common 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
non-consent: P. Westen, The Logic of Consent: The Diversity and Deceptiveness of Consent as a Defence to 
Criminal Conduct (Ashgate Publishing Ltd: Aldershot, 2004) 183. 
105 The Sexual Offences Act 2003, s. 75(2)(d).  
106 The Sexual Offences Act 2003, s. 75(2)(e). 
107 The Sexual Offences Act 2003, s. 75(2)(f). 
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law.108 There is no need for debate in relation to its proposed inclusion in the list of situations 
where consent will be deemed to be absent.  
 
The second provision which deems consent to be absent where the complainant is unable to 
communicate only applies to those with physical disability and does not refer to complainants 
with a mental disorder who are not capable of communicating whether or not they consent.109 
Examples of individuals who may be affected by this provision are those suffering from 
cerebral palsy or the effects of a stroke.110 Simester and Sullivan note that this provision 
might raise issues where there is an existing sexual relationship such that there is a mutual 
understanding about consent.111 However, in such a scenario, a defendant would be able to 
exculpate himself where he lacked the mens rea for rape.112 Consequently, this fact scenario 
should be included within the second tier. The definition of consent proposed here is instilled 
with the ideal of communicative sexuality, that is, that consent should be communicated. This 
ideology must be carried through to the second tier of the definition. If an individual cannot 
communicate, then she cannot give a valid consent and must be protected from unwanted 
sexual intrusion. Although the circumstances outlined in this provision are unlikely to occur 
very often, it is worthwhile as it fits within the ideology of the proposed approach to consent 
and protects potentially vulnerable individuals from unwanted sexual intrusion. 
 
The English provision relating to intoxication is complex and has received criticism from 
commentators for a number of reasons.113 On a practical level, it is of limited effect as it 
applies mainly to the ‘drug rape’ scenario where a complainant has had a drug such as 
Rohypnol surreptitiously administered to her. Hence, the provision may be seen as 
                                                          
108 R v Mayers (1872) 12 Cox CC 311; R v Larter & Castleton [1995] Criminal Law Review 75. 
109 See Rook and Ward, above n. 57 at 74. Individuals with mental incapacity are dealt with under other 
provisions of the law: Sexual Offences Act 2003, ss. 30-44.  
110 Ibid. 
111 A.P. Simester and G.R .Sullivan, Criminal Law: Theory & Doctrine, 5th edn (Hart Publishing: Oxford, 2013) 
480. 
112 Ibid. Such a defendant would not have an intention to have sexual intercourse with the complainant without 
her consent and would not be reckless regarding her lack of consent. In any event, in an Irish context, such a 
defendant could rely on the honest belief in consent defence which exculpates a defendant who has an honest 
belief that the complainant was consenting: Criminal Law (Rape) Act 1981, s. 2(2).  
113 E. Finch and V.E. Munro, ‘The Sexual Offences Act 2003: Intoxicated Consent and Drug-Assisted Rape 
Revisited’ (2004) Criminal Law Review 789; J. Temkin and A. Ashworth, ‘The Sexual Offences Act 2003: 
Rape, Sexual Assault and the Problems of Consent’ (2004) Criminal Law Review 328, 339-340. 
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representing a retrograde step. The common law provides that consent is vitiated where the 
complainant is intoxicated to such a degree that she is unable to provide a valid consent to 
sexual activity.114 Although this guidance is vague, there is no distinction between voluntary 
and involuntary intoxication.  
 
Temkin and Ashworth posit that the English provision on intoxicated consent places those 
who take alcohol or drugs voluntarily in a different moral category from those who have had 
alcohol or drugs ‘administered’ to them against their will.115 Consequently, the provision may 
be seen as protecting those who can be construed as ‘innocent’ victims.116 However, Temkin 
and Ashworth suggest that even in situations where the defendant has not induced the 
complainant’s intoxication, he may still have taken advantage of the fact that, as a result of 
intoxication, the complainant was unable to resist his advances or to make an informed 
decision about whether to engage in sexual activity.117 Distinguishing between voluntary and 
involuntary intoxication would appear to be based on the notion of the ‘deserving victim’ as 
opposed to the practical effects which intoxicants may have on an individual’s capacity to 
consent.118 There is already a societal tendency to attribute blame to complainants who do not 
conform to societal ideals of the ‘real victim’ by engaging in what is seen to be ‘risky’ or 
inappropriate behaviour such as drinking to excess. It would be very unfortunate if the new 
legislative approach to defining consent had the effect of compounding the societal tendency 
to vilify such complainants. The salient issue for jurors is the impact which intoxication had 
upon the complainant’s capacity to choose. The source of the intoxication is irrelevant. 
Creating a distinction between voluntary and involuntary intoxication merely perpetuates 
prejudicial stereotypes in the law. 
 
For these reasons, an alternative wording in relation to intoxication is preferable to the 
English approach. The second tier should state that consent will be deemed to be absent 
where ‘the complainant was too affected by alcohol or drugs to freely agree to sexual 
                                                          
114 R v Lang (1975) 62 Cr App R 50.  
115 See Temkin and Ashworth, above n. 113 at 339-340. 
116 Ibid. 
117 Ibid. 
118 See P.N.S. Rumney and R.A. Fenton, ‘Intoxicated Consent in Rape: Bree and Juror Decision-Making’ (2008) 
71 Modern Law Review 279, 288 and Firth, above n. 41 at 115. 
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activity’. Admittedly, this is a vague provision and whether an individual was ‘too affected 
by alcohol or drugs to freely agree’ will have to be determined on a case-by-case basis. Since 
a high number of cases involve an intoxicated complainant, such determinations will need to 
be made on a frequent basis.119 However, given the difficulty of gauging the impact of 
intoxication upon an individual’s capacity to consent, this is the only approach which is 
suitable. As noted in Bree, it would be unrealistic to endeavour to create some kind of grid 
system which would enable determinations of capacity to be related to some prescribed level 
of alcohol consumption.120 The differing effects which alcohol and drugs may have on 
differing individuals and even on the same individuals on different occasions means there can 
be no definitive guidelines on precisely when an individual’s ability to consent is obviated by 
intoxication. Thus, any guidance which is given in this area must be flexible. The best that 
the law can achieve here is to send a clear message that, regardless of whether intoxication 
was voluntary or involuntary, there is a point of intoxication beyond which an individual is 
not capable of exercising genuine sexual choice. Although it is not ideal that determinations 
of capacity in this area must be made in an ad hoc manner in individual cases, this is the only 
approach which is workable in light of the individualised manner in which capacity to 
consent must be assessed. Even though the provision recommended here does not, and indeed 
could not, provide a test for determining whether an individual is so intoxicated that she 
cannot freely agree to sexual activity, it is still meaningful.  
 
Additional provisions not present in English law 
Whilst in general the fact scenarios contained in the 2003 Act represent appropriate guidance 
on consent, there are some additional situations which could be included in the Irish reforms 
in order to ensure that the second tier is as comprehensive as possible. First, there should be a 
provision which states that consent will be absent where ‘agreement is expressed by a third 
party not the complainant’.121 It might be thought that this is unnecessary as it merely states 
                                                          
119 Statistics on the number of Irish cases involving intoxicated complainants are provided in the discussion of 
the Irish law above.  
120 [2007] EWCA Crim 804, para. 35. 
121 A similar provision had been considered for inclusion in the 2003 Act but was rejected during the 
parliamentary debates. See Home Office, above n. 101 at para 2.10.9; Temkin and Ashworth, above n. 113 at 
339. For a synopsis of the discussion of this provision in parliament: See Home Affairs Committee, Sexual 
Offences Bill: Fifth Report of Session 2002-03 (The Stationery Office Ltd, 2003), para. 33. 
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the obvious.122 However, there is value in the law stating unequivocally that if sexual activity 
with someone is being contemplated then reasonable steps must have been taken to ensure 
that she has expressed her consent to it.123 This is particularly the case given the fact that the 
proposed new law is intended to convey the message that consent must be communicated 
effectively between sexual partners. 
 
The second additional provision which should be included is one which deals with 
withdrawal of consent. Common law provides that consent to sex may be withdrawn at any 
time and continuing to engage in sexual activity once consent has been withdrawn will make 
the defendant liable for rape.124 This rule should be placed on a legislative footing. The 
second tier should include the situation where ‘the complainant having originally consented 
to engage in sexual activity expresses by words or conduct a lack of agreement to continue to 
engage in the activity’.125  
 
Finally, the second tier should include the situation where the defendant induces the 
complainant to submit to sexual activity by abusing his position of trust, power or authority. 
This scenario could arise in the context of professional or caring relationships such as: 
medical professionals and their patients; religious advisors and those they minister to; social 
workers and those who they care for or; lawyers and their clients. Such relationships are of a 
fiduciary nature, that is, one person has justifiably placed confidence, faith and reliance in 
another whose aid, advice or protection is sought in some matter.126 Jorgenson notes that 
most people seeking help from a therapist, physician, or lawyer do so in an admitted position 
of vulnerability, coping with a physical or psychological problem, a threatening legal matter, 
                                                          
122 See Scottish Law Commission, above n. 71 at 35. 
123 This was the recommendation of the Scottish Law Commission in their consideration of reform of the rules 
relating to consent in Scottish sexual offences law: Ibid. at 35. This provision has been included in section 
13(2)(f) of the Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009. It is noteworthy that a similar provision is also to be found 
in section 273.1(2)(a) of the Canadian Criminal Code. 
124 R v Kaitamaki [1985] AC 147. 
125 This wording has been taken from section 273.2(e) of the Canadian Criminal Code. A similar provision may 
be found in section 15(3) of the Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009 which provides that consent to conduct 
may be withdrawn at any time before, or in the case of continuing conduct, during, the conduct. Section 15(4) 
provides that if the conduct takes place, or continues to take place, after consent has been withdrawn, it takes 
place, or continues to take place, without consent. 
126 L.M. Jorgenson, ‘Sexual Contact in Fiduciary Relationships: Legal Perspectives’ in J.C. Gonsioreck (ed), 




or perhaps simply the vulnerability intrinsic to lack of knowledge.127 The undesirability of 
sexual relationships between professionals and their clients is evidenced in the fact that the 
codes of conduct of many professions contain an express ban on such relationships.128 The 
rationale for such censure is clear. These relationships present unique opportunities for the 
stronger party to abuse his position in order to induce the weaker party to submit to sexual 
intercourse. For example, the professional may threaten to withdraw his support or to reveal 
secrets which he has discovered in the course of the relationship.  
 
However, whilst abuse of trust in these relationships may result in censure from professional 
bodies, it is unclear whether it would attract criminal liability. Of course, as pointed out by 
the Scottish Law Commission, a scenario where a professional abuses his position of 
authority in order to procure sexual activity with a vulnerable individual would probably be 
covered by one or more other situations on the list such as those relating to fraud or 
coercion.129 Nevertheless, there may be circumstances which do not fit within the other 
presumptions and where it might be thereby difficult to prove that consent was absent.130 
Moreover, it is worth sending a clear message about the inappropriateness of this kind of 
abuse of authority. To make clear that such circumstances are within the remit of the criminal 
law, the list of situations where consent will be deemed to be absent should include the 
circumstance where ‘the complainant submits to sexual activity because of the abuse of a 
position of authority or trust’.131 An individual should be found to stand in a position of 
authority or trust in relation to a complainant when he has supervisory or disciplinary 
                                                          
127 Ibid. at 240. 
128 For example, the code of conduct for medical professionals expressly forbids sexual relationships with 
patients: Irish Medical Council, Guide to Professional Conduct and Ethics for Registered Medical Practitioners, 
7th edn (Medical Council: Dublin, 2009) para. 16.1. A similar prohibition may be found in the code of conduct 
for counsellors and psychotherapists: National Counselling Institute of Ireland, Code of Ethics and Practice for 
Counsellors and Psychotherapists (National Counselling Institute of Ireland: Dublin, 2008) para. 2.2.7.  
129 Scottish Law Commission, Discussion Paper on Rape and other Sexual Offences (The Stationery Office: 
Edinburgh, 2006) para. 3.55. 
130 For example, Temkin notes that a patient may not wish to have sexual relations with her therapist but may 
fear that he will otherwise terminate therapy, a result which she is too dependent or emotionally disturbed to 
contemplate. Alternatively she may welcome the therapist’s advances or be too confused to resist them: See 
Temkin, above n. 2 at 108. Although this conduct is reprehensible, a jury may not be willing to accept that it 
constitutes a threat sufficient to vitiate consent unless a provision of abuse of authority is available. 
131 This wording is based on section 61HA(6)(c) of the Crimes Act 1900 (New South Wales). A similar 
provision may be found in section 273.1(2)(c) of the Canadian Criminal Code. 
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authority over the complainant or is engaged in the provision of professional treatment, 
assessment or counselling to the complainant.132  
 
The proposed second tier of the definition of consent in Irish law 
At this point it is worth demonstrating the way in which the proposed second tier of the 
definition of consent would be presented in legislation:   
 
A complainant is to be taken not to have consented to sexual activity where: 
 
1) the defendant intentionally deceived the complainant as to the nature or 
purpose of sexual activity; 
2) the defendant intentionally induced the complainant to consent to sexual 
activity by impersonating a person known personally to the complainant133; 
3) the complainant submits to sexual activity as a result of violence or threats of 
violence towards the complainant or towards a third party; 
4) the complainant was, and the defendant was not, unlawfully detained at the 
time of the relevant act; 
5) the complainant submits to sexual activity as a result of threats of serious harm 
or serious detriment of any type to the complainant or a third party; 
6) the complainant was asleep or otherwise unconscious at the time of the 
relevant act; 
                                                          
132 This definition is adapted from a model provision recommended by Schulhofer: See above n. 91 at 283-284. 
The New South Wales and Canadian provisions do not define what is meant by a position of authority or trust. 
133 This is a slightly amended version of the equivalent English provision which does not seem to require that 
the defendant’s deceit as to the nature or purpose of the act actually caused the complainant to consent. This is 
significant since the fraud may not actually have impacted on the complainant’s decision whether or not to 
consent. Although in practice it is unlikely that the courts would find an absence of consent in such a 




7) the complainant was too affected by alcohol or drugs to freely agree to sexual 
activity; 
8) agreement is expressed by a third party not the complainant; 
9) the complainant having originally consented to engage in sexual activity 
expresses by words or conduct a lack of agreement to continue to engage in 
the activity; or 
10) the complainant submits to sexual activity because of the abuse of a position 
of authority or trust. 
 
This provision offers an important buttress for the definition of consent proposed above. 
First, it supports the new positive definition of consent by providing express guidance on the 
types of situations which will contravene the requirements of freedom, choice and capacity.  
Second, the provision supports the standard of communicative sexuality by encouraging 
jurors to look at the context of the impugned sexual encounter and not rely on stereotypes 
about rape or on the factors which have been traditionally held to vitiate consent. Given that 
these provisions deem consent to be absent, concern might be raised that this provision would 
contravene the fair trial rights of defendants.134 However, it is submitted that the proposed 
provision will not fall foul of due process safeguards. First, although consent will be deemed 
to be absent when one of these situations is found to exist, this merely serves to prove the 
actus reus of rape. The defendant cannot be convicted unless it is shown that he had the 
requisite mens rea regarding the complainant’s consent. Second, the existence of the 
circumstances must be proven beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution and this is a 
considerable hurdle which must be surmounted before consent will be deemed to be absent. 
Consequently, it is submitted that the proposed provision will not compromise defendants’ 
due process rights.  
 
                                                          
134 These rights are protected by Article 38.1 of the Irish Constitution and Article 6 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights.  
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The success of the second tier is heavily dependent on the way in which it is implemented 
and presented to the jury by trial judges.  Thus, the bench book which was discussed above 
should also contain guidance on the list of situations where consent will be deemed to be 
absent. Trial judges should be directed on how to instruct jurors on the significance of the 
situations on this list, that is, if they are satisfied that one of these situations is present in the 
case before them, consent will be deemed to be absent. Judges will also require guidance so 
that the second tier is applied in a progressive manner. For example, trial judges should be 
shown how to direct jurors regarding the types of threats which may be sufficient to vitiate 
consent, bearing in mind that the legislation seeks to broaden the definition of such threats 
beyond those of physical violence. Similarly, judges may need to be shown how to direct 
jurors in relation to the abuse of a position of authority provision, which is a new addition to 
the law. Thus, as with the definition of consent, the bench book will provide an invaluable 
mechanism for ensuring that the second tier achieves its full potential and offers optimum 
support to the general definition of consent. 
 
Conclusion 
The absence of a legislative definition of consent in Ireland has ensured that it lags behind its 
common law counterparts and that the prosecution is not afforded optimum opportunity to 
prove an absence of consent in rape trials. The definition of consent proposed here would 
offer a marked improvement upon the current law. The two-tier definition sends a clear 
message about what is necessary for a legally valid consent to sexual activity. In centring on 
the requirement of ‘free agreement’ and setting out prerequisites for a valid consent, the 
concept of communicative sexuality is introduced which encourages a new context-sensitive 
approach in juror deliberations about consent and thereby provides the prosecution with a 
fairer opportunity to prove that consent was absent. This process is facilitated by the second 
tier which gives clear examples of the breadth of circumstances which are capable of 
depriving an individual of the ability to exercise genuine sexual choice. Since many of these 
scenarios would not be seen as capable of vitiating consent under the current rules, the second 
tier thus helps to extend the reach of the criminal law and thereby broadens protection from 




Certainly, the introduction of a definition of consent is not an end in itself. Much effort will 
be required to ensure that the new provisions are appropriately and progressively applied by 
trial judges. The judicial training initiatives and the bench book proposed here are vital tools 
which must be introduced if legislative clarification of consent is to achieve practical results. 
Thus, to a certain extent, the introduction of a definition of consent would mark only the 
beginning of the process of change in this area. In many ways, ‘the complex and largely 
invisible task’135 of enforcing the new definition in the institutions of the criminal justice 
system is where the real progress will be made. At the same time, statutory clarification of 
consent represents a vital first step towards change and would signify the Irish legislature’s 
commitment to development of an area of the law which has lain stagnant and neglected for 
far too long. 
                                                          
135 L. Snider, ‘Feminism, Punishment and the Potential of Empowerment’ (1994) 9 Canadian Journal of Law 
and Society 75 98. 
